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1 Journalists as professionals in theory 
and reality 
Propaganda, a program of creating opinion, should serve the state as 
well as political, social and union organizations. But, the journalist 
should not feel he is a worker for the propaganda apparatus. Nat-
urally, in the process of gathering information, the journalist will 
represent some point of view but this should be his point of view 
spoken in his name. Stefan Bratkowski, Chairman, 
Polish Journalists Association, 1980-81 
Who speaks here? One of the "mouthpieces" of communist rule, 
carefully schooled in the rules and rhetoric of communism so that he 
could lead the population? Yes, but these are also the words of a 
professional journalist committed to his rights as a professional to 
work without interference for his own professional goals of service to 
the society and to professional leadership. Bratkowski's words were 
spoken, after the victory of Solidarity, as Polish journalists moved to 
reclaim their professional rights. The words are those of both a con-
summate professional and a committed political actor. 
Although Bratkowski was a leader in the profession, he was hardly 
unique. He, like his colleagues, is a product of explicitly political 
indoctrination. Yet, his message was a call to try to improve the system 
not merely to serve the Party. In his case, like that of many of his 
colleagues, he had strived for some thirty years to make his work his 
own rather than merely to shape it to fit Party doctrines and censors' 
regulations. Like his colleagues, he turned to his professional associ-
ation not for instruction but liberation, however much it had been 
concerned primarily with instructing. Like his colleagues, he used his 
profession to involve himself in policy and politics. And, like his 
colleagues, he was a product of and actor in Poland's traumas and 
revolts beginning in 1948 and culminating, for his generation at least, 
in the hopes and disappointments of Solidarity and its repression in 
martial law. His professionalism and that of his fellows defies tra-
ditional Western theories. It demands explanation. 
1 
2 Poland's journalists 
Journalists and journalism in Poland were important actors and 
elements in the battles of Solidarity. The media they produced was a 
major concern for both Solidarity and the government. And, while 
battles went on between Solidarity and the government over issues 
related to the mass media, journalists fought with both sides to be 
allowed to produce what they felt, as professionals, was right. Some of 
their number used professional positions to take active roles in govern-
ment and others used them to take roles in Solidarity. Still others used 
the journalists' association to increase professional power and auton-
omy and to negotiate policy as their profession's representatives. But, 
whatever their personal or institutional politics, journalists almost 
universally agreed on what their professional demands and stances 
should be, just as they had done in earlier years. Most of those stances 
made it difficult for them to conform to the ruler's wishes. 
When martial law was imposed, journalists were the first of the 
professional groups in Poland to organize to resist it. In addition, their 
actions during the Solidarity period appeared so threatening and pow-
erful to the rulers that journalists, as a group, were directly attacked in 
the initial martial law declarations. More than one-third of Poland's 
journalists in those first days were either fired from their jobs or 
refused to work in their old positions in the face of the retreat from 
media freedom. The journalists' professional association then became 
the first formal professional group since the communist takeover in 
1945 to be permanently disbanded and replaced. The group's un-
declared "crime," both before and after martial law, appears ultimately 
to have been ~ts insistence on acting and being treated as professionals 
rather than as obedient followers of political leaders. 
Their apparent defeat under martial law, when the various legal 
gains they had made previously were essentially rescinded or reduced 
and their professional elite was forced to leave the profession, makes 
their professional life no less significant. Past experiences of this group 
explain how professional groups develop out of a very politically 
controlled atmosphere, how professionals work around various kinds 
of political pressures, and what the countervailing forces are against 
the politicization of all decision-making. The actions of journalists after 
martial law was declared and the concern of the regime with control-
ling the profession (especially those who had earlier supported com-
munist regimes) demonstrate the strength of the professional impulse 
for independence and the viability of professional links in creating this 
independent world. Finally, pressure was continued for the same 
professional rights and privileges by the quisling journalists' organiza-
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tion established in 1982. This is a further measure of the significance of 
professional values. 
Traditional Western theories of socialization, of interest group be-
havior, or of change in communist societies do little to explain Polish 
journalists' behavior in this crisis situation and in earlier periods of 
crisis in Poland (1956, 1968, and 1970). Nor do they explain their 
behavior, in the public eye and behind the scenes, under more normal 
conditions. Such behavior is more usefully explained by Western 
theories of professionalization and professional group behavior. This 
theory provides a model for groups (like doctors, lawyers, account-
ants, social workers, and other self-defined or publicly recognized 
"professions") who control unique bodies of knowledge not shared by 
the rest of society. The possession and use of this knowledge is regu-
lated by the groups' internal structures as well as regulations rein-
forced by the broader society .1 Furthermore, professionals are defined 
as being part of occupational groups that have gone through a process 
involving the establishment of professional organizations and school-
ing, developing full-time work commitments, and pressing for the 
right to control their own work and membership. 2 In any society these 
groups, one of which is usually defined as the journalism profession, 
are able to claim some autonomy and self-control - as journalists in 
Poland have. 3 They also have a higher level of formal and informal 
interaction and organization than other social or occupational groups. 
This they have by virtue of their controlled membership, common 
interests and values, close connections with each other for large parts 
of their lives, and their self-claimed special roles in society. 4 
The stress in professionalization theory is on the importance not of 
formal structures and formally stated positions, actions and demands 
(the least significant form of professional activity in the West and the 
one that most depends on the "permission" of the political leadership 
in the East), but on informal group formation as well as the de-
velopment of values and action based on the rewards and pressures 
inherent in professional work anywhere. 5 Even though some of these 
demands and rewards differ from those of journalists' counterparts in 
the West, the mechanisms of professional life appear to be comparable. 
This approach then gives dimension to the label of "professional" 
and "professionalized" that so often is used to label any independent 
contribution by intellectuals in a communist society. 6 It also provides a 
model for what goes on behind the lines before the political leadership 
invites professional participation in policy decisions. In fact, this socio-
logical theory helps explain what has been unexplainable in studies of 
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communist systems: apparent independent professional action and 
reaction in the context of politically controlled professional 
organizations. 
The place of Marxism-Leninism and the mass media 
The significance of the mass media in any society, but 
especially in those where mobilization and modernization are primary 
goals, sets the journalism profession apart from other professions. 
Journalists play a broader social and political role than other pro-
fessionals for whom politics has limited political relevance in their 
work lives. Journalists and their media are charged with being, at least, 
the "gatekeepers" for all but interpersonal communications in the 
society. 7 The nature of their professional life weighs directly on this 
role. As research on the role of the mass media and its messages done 
in the West, developing societies, and communist states has shown, 
the professional life and attitudes of journalists are critical influences 
on the nature of the news presented. 8 
In the European press tradition, where the press initially developed 
as, and remained, a partisan force that accepts responsibility for the 
"good of the society," the role of journalists as professionals is further 
increased. 9 Polish journalists were not only representatives of various 
political factions and spokesmen for them throughout Polish history, 
but they were also representatives of the national interest and national 
culture during the entire Partition period. Then, the three powers 
occupying Poland allowed Poles virtually no avenues other than their 
controlled press to express their nationalism and their political ideas. 10 
The Marxist-Leninist tradition grows out of this European tradition. In 
postwar Poland, Marxism built upon, even as it distorted, the histori-
cal responsibilities of the Polish press. 
Ironically, the ideological basis for the current "Marxist-Leninist" 
press is, in fact, a product of the Stalinist period. Neither Marx nor 
Lenin discussed in detail the organization and role of the press in a 
post-revolutionary society. Marx merely termed the press "a mirror of 
the spirit of the nation." 11 Lenin saw the press as the most effective 
instrument for fomenting revolution. 12 Only with the advent of Stali-
nism was this revolutionary image transformed into a structure for the 
press system of a ruling party. The Stalinist structure has remained the 
basis for press organization in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
and the ideological touchstone with which journalists and political 
leaders justify their actions. 
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Discussion in this section will be limited to the political ideology 
presented to Polish journalists. It is not intended to be a comprehen-
sive discussion of the Marxist-Leninist theory of the press. The Lenin-
ist definition of "freedom of the press" on which communist states' 
ideology is focused is one in which there is economic control by the 
"workers" over the means of press production and, thus, workers' 
interests have precedence over those of the producers of the press. 13 
Communist ideologists stress this use of the press as an instrument 
both to influence and to reflect working-class opinion. Party domi-
nation over the press is, thus, inherently justified by its role as the 
"vanguard" of the proletariat and by the need to solidify popular 
opinion to further the revolution. 14 
This Stalinist version of the Marxist-Leninist press was imposed on 
Poland after World War II. When this was done, the press' target 
audience was shifted from the literate, urbanized intelligentsia to the 
workers. The g~af'Y.~-~.l!l9.~Uiiiti,9n not policy debate. But the focus on 
ad"vo.cacy and analysis a_!.1!1~~-~~-~!~1:1.c!~~in.g the population; s"thiniing 
to fit historical traditiclns. This, combined with the respect for . the 
prewar national media which had long upheld national goals while 
operating under external political controls, helped preserve the legacy 
of Polish press traditions even in the Stalinist period. 
The crucial tract in Polish and Soviet scholars' discussions of the 
ideological foundations of the communist press systems is What Is To 
Be Done? (written by Lenin in 1902 as a plan for the revolution in 
Russia). In it, a heavy burden is placed on the press to serve as the 
political leadership for the underground. 
The organization, which will form around this (all Russian revol-
utionary paper) will be ready for everything, from upholding the 
honour, the prestige, and the continuity of the Party in acute revol-
utionary "depression" to preparing for, appointing the time for, and 
carrying out the nation-wide, armed uprising. 15 
This activist image of journalism makes the press "not only a collective 
propagandist and collective agitator but also a collective organizer."16 
On the other hand, the publication of information for its own sake 
never entered into these discussions. Professional jQ!].rD~lism isL thus, 
inseparable from _ p<:>littca~_ -~-~tion and the development through the 
"press ·of ties with workers and peasants and between workers and 
peasants. 17 
The Stalinist contribution to this ideological basis of journalism was a 
tipping of the balance in favor of journalists as political propagandists 
rather t~an as independent agitators. Journalists' popular ties were 
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intended to be made and maintained by worker-peasant correspon-
dents. This made the press and the journalists that produced it a part of 
the "thread from the Party, through the newspaper, which extends to 
all worker-peasant districts without exception so that the interaction of 
the Party and state, on the one hand, and the industrial and peasant 
districts, on the other, is complete."18 
This reduced both journalists' control over the media and the signifi-
cance of the press as an independent institution. At the same time, the 
Soviet-model press is also a monitor of the bureaucracy and its admin-
istrative practices. As such, the press is responsible for collecting 
citizens' complaints, checking their validity, and forcing action on the 
valid ones. 19 Finally, there is a clear stress on economic and social 
modernization. 
The Soviet press over the years has been one means by which a 
predominantly illiterate Soviet population was taught to read, and by 
which it acquired much of the information necessary for daily living in 
a nation being transformed from an agrarian into an industrialized, 
urban society. 20 
Journalism is, thus, by definition, a political pr~fession in communist 
societies like Poland. To be politically invoived is not necessarily to be 
less professional or professionally active. In fact, for journalists, being 
politically active is often a way to forward one's career and do pro-
fessional work just as, for many lawyers in the United States, political 
positions and activities are a career enhancement. 21 And, just as politi-
cal pressure has often increased journalists' professionalization, the 
use of political channels and ties has been their way to perform one of 
their key self-declared professional roles, that of monitor and 
ombudsman. 
In describing their work, Polish journalists in the seventies empha-
sized that they were experts first and then communists and not an 
amalgam of the two or simply professionals in the service of the Party. 
At the same time, they made it clear that, although they earned their 
salaries from having articles published or programs broadcast, much of 
what they regarded as professional work involved "behind the 
scenes" work with political and governmental authorities through a 
variety of channels and on a variety of levelsSFor them, then, partici-
pation in Party and governmental bodies by making use of their per-
sonal ties and connections, serving as experts on commissions, 
working on professional and policy issues as advisors to citizens' 
groups as well as government groups, revealing information, speaking 
at public forums, or being censored and then reprinted in the censors' 
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reports for top Party officials were all useful channels in professional 
workl In the Solidarity period, journalists' self-defined professional 
worGlso involved journalists participating in intellectual committees 
to draft press and censorship legislation, schooling young aspirants to 
the profession, and organizing or acting in bodies discussing policy. 
And, particularly after the declaration of martial law, for some, pro-
fessional work was extended to w_1}tJ~gj~ __ 4!?.§iq~nt publications or 
keeping up to date on events and verbally spreading information. 
Clearly then, in comparison to most other professions, Polish jour-
nalism is a special case. Journalists, more than any other profession in 
Poland, are expected to participate in political activities as part of their 
professional work, as defined by their own professional values and the 
state ideology, simply because the media plays such a critical political 
role. They also have the least clearly defined professional qualifications 
and skills so they are the most easily politically regulated and pene-
trated profession. However, from their own reports and the limited 
published data that exists, it is clear that, no matter how long and at 
what level journalists hold political positions, they maintain strong 
connections with the profession. So, whatever their ostensible tasks or 
goals, they act first of all as representatives of the journalism 
profession. 
Regardless of the rhetoric about the media being the handmaiden of 
the Party and "vanguard of the working class," until the introduction 
of martial law, t_!le presence of professional journalists on Party and 
state bodies and on citizen groups (including Solidarity), as informal 
contributors to policy discussions, was of benefit to the political lead1-.· 
ership. If they participated in Party or state bodies publicly, journalists 
tended to lend an aura of credibility to these bodies. They also gave 
their usually faceless membership a clear, publicly recognizable face. 
And, as recognizable participants in decisions or as behind the scenes 
actors, journalists and editors served, throughout the postwar period, 
as necessary links between individuals and groups who shared their 
interests and expertise. Journalists were, after all, normally the links 
between groups and with the population and its problems for other 
actors in policy-making. 
This balance between professionalism and political involvement is 
not without tension. On the one hand, since Journalists are so closely 
intertwined with the Party and state elite, they are well aware of the 
conflicts, problems and policy shifts within that elite. Hence, they can 
and do exploit conflicts, problems or shifts to protect their ability to do 
their work and to push issues that are of interest to them. They also can 
8 Poland's journalists 
make public disputes that the leadership is trying to cover over. On the 
other hand, although the number of formal positions journalists hold 
in Party and state bodies and the intensity of personal contacts be-
tween top leaders and journalists is determined by non-journalists, 
these outsiders cannot create or control journalists' desire to be in-
volved or their persistent pressure to be heard. Nor do their demands 
do anything but exacerbate the conflicting pressure on journalists to be 
advocates and monitors of the state and the society around them. After 
all, journalists' reading of their ideologically mandated role, however 
they see the system, is that they should be "a loyal opposition party in 
the British sense," monitoring the carrying out of policy and proposing 
adjustments to it, while protecting their ability to perform professional 
work correctly. 
Traditional approaches to groups and policy making: a .., 
critique 
Western scholars have observed journalists and other white-
collar groups in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as the key 
interest articulators of these systems. Even in taking into account the 
extent to which journalists and other professionals are "political," the 
growing strength and independence of specialists and professionals as 
well as the resulting divergence between stated policy and its ex-
ecution in communist countries have been undeniable. How this all 
happened has remained a puzzle for which the only key has seemed to 
be the desire of the political leadership to use professionals' expertise 
on particular issues. 
Groups and the aggregation of group interests in socialist states have 
virtually no ideological justification in Marxism-Leninism. The evol-
ution toward communism is supposed to result in an evolution away 
from individuals seeing themselves as part of separate and competing 
groups. 22 The structures of the Party and state, as well as of social 
organizations, have been designed to insure that autonomous group 
interests do not develop and are not articulated. Instead, organiz-
ational structures for professional and social organizations are in-
tended to be "transmission belts" for guidance from the political elite 
to be communicated to organization members and for information on 
membership activities and concerns to be transferred back to the politi-
cal leadership. So, they are not intended to articulate or aggregate 
specific interests, much less develop an insular group identity. 23 
How does professional expertise develop independently enough for 
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the leadership to hear more than simply approbation of its policy 
proposals? Why, in times of relative freedom, do professionals 
suddenly appear to present a coherent and consistent set of pro-
fessional demands almost without time for prior discussion or germi-
nation? How does the professional community, which must serve as a 
basis for all this, develop, given the strict controls over organizations in 
these societies? These are all parts of the puzzle of the role of the 
intelligentsia in communist societies. They have never been satis-
factorily put together. Western blind spots are increased by a research 
focus on academic and research specialists and what they write rather 
than on professionals and their work. Those with whom we have been 
the least concerned are the practitioners who, like journalists, after all, 
help create policy from their positions in advisory bodies and who take 
policy and remold it in their day to day work as professionals. 24 
At the same time, research on the policy process that has focused on 
individual policies and their implementation in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe has generally concluded that involved professionals, 
like "the managers, teachers, educators and scientists" Joel Schwartz 
and William Keech found to have been the most influential in blocking 
Khrushchev's educational reform proposal, 25 are the most powerful 
actors. Yet little is known about why this happens since professional 
opposition to leadership policies is seldom actually sanctioned or pub-
licized. The impetus for action is assumed to be the desire on the part of 
individuals "to protect interests derived from occupational roles," as is 
true for any professional in Western society. 26 The power of these 
profe~sionals and their specialist counterparts is, further, seen in 
Western professional literature as deriving from "their technical ex-
pertise, their indispensability to the ruling circles, and their access to 
influential media of communication,"27 as well as from their less well 
defined ability to drag their feet or reinterpret the policies they are to 
follow. 28 
The entrance and involvement of these specialists and professionals 
into the policy process has been seen by Western researchers as being a 
result of an invitation from or the weakness of the political lead-
ership. 29 Although the totalitarianism of Stalinist control seems to have 
been far less strict than it appeared in the 1950s, it is clear that both the 
level of group activity and the visibility of that activity have increased 
with the technological modernization of the post-Stalin years. The 
increase in the technological knowledge and sophistication required 
for decisions to be made has clearly increased political leaders' propen-
sity to seek advice and defer to it or to allow professionals ever in-
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creasing autonomy in the performance of their roles. 30 Beyond the 
simply technological imperatives, political leaders' increasing claims of 
deference to specialist and professional interests also have been used 
as a measure of their desire to involve and integrate an increasingly 
complex and educated population in the policy process. The claim then 
is that leadership decisions come from experts and are not politically 
motivated. 31 
Western theorists have differed on the fundamental nature of 
groups in these societies. Claims of full comparability between groups 
and group input in communist societies and pluralist Western societies 
are not made either in group theory (which has never dealt with "the 
communist case")32 or by those who have sought to apply that interest 
group theory, however imperfect the fit, to behavior in communist 
states. 33 Furthermore, few parallels have been drawn, in theory or in 
actual research, between the behavior and demands of specific Proups 
in the West and in the Soviet bloc. 
The variety of definitions of "group" in communist politics given in 
1969 demonstrates the disagreement among theorists on the nature of 
"groups" and on the key lines of social and political division in com-
munist societies. In the ensuing years, that definition has been made 
no clearer: 
Brzezinski and Huntington see policy-relevant groups as forming 
principally upon occupational lines (and at the upper reaches of the 
Soviet elite), such as the military, the state bureaucracy, the Party 
apparatchiki, etc. Meyer, cautioning against all attempts at an a priori 
listing, suggests that interest groups may form around issues or 
individual political leaders or bureaucrats, in addition to occupations. 
Barghoorn, following Leonard, argues that the major policy group-
ings do not form along occupational lines but cut across these to 
coalesce around issue orientations. They are most usefully identified 
as "modernizers and conservatives, revisionists and dogmatists." 
Skilling and Griffiths similarly conclude that groupings most fre-
quently form around issues, but unlike Barghoorn, they see a great 
multiplicity of viewpoints . . . Brzezinski, Azrael, and Barghoorn 
stress the Party's formal monopoly over decision making and the 
weakness of interest groups. At the same time, they suggest that 
certain groups, especially those with relatively high institutional co-
hesion, such as the military, may occasionally act as successful veto 
groups, successfully resisting Kremlin pressures. Meyer, while point-
ing out the serious lack of knowledge of Soviet policy making pro-
cesses, suggests that the interests of a wide variety of groups are 
considered by Soviet decision-makers. At the same time, he con-
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eludes usually such interests do not count heavily. Griffiths, Skilling 
and Meissner, by contrast, argue that certain kinds of strategic group-
ings do count very heavily in Soviet decision-making. 34 
Even studies of the roles of specific p'rofessional or specialist groups or 
of the making of individual policies have hedged on the question of the 
real meaning and composition of groups. 35 Measurement of strength 
or influence is done not on the basis of group action but by external 
evaluation both of the perquisites and position of members in each of 
these externally defined groups36 and the correlations between the 
public statements of group members and the changes made in policies 
from their initial presentations to their enactment. 37 
Studies of interest groups' input into policy have also failed to 
grapple with the nature of group interaction. In most of the research 
that has been done, group interests have been treated as those of 
essentially "non-associational groups" identified not by their own 
organization but by their common individual reactions to policy moves 
and their common social or demographic characteristics. 38 This is done 
without any clear evidence of interaction and self-identification within 
a group. Such different entities as formal groups, social groups, and 
"groups" that represent a common opinion held by individuals with 
no sense that they have anything in common thus get equated. The 
assumption is that all affiliations are potentially equal and significant 
group interests are not recognized by the polity. 
The loyalty of Party members to any of the other groups they might 
join is an open and unanswered question, although most researchers 
take it for granted that Party membership is the dominant force in an 
indiviaual's life simply because the Party is so selective and requires 
such a high level of constant organized activity and identification. 
Furthermore, since membership in the Communist Party is required 
for many responsible professional positions, the assumption is that it is 
the primary force for both institutions and individuals. 39 
Focused as most research has been on academic specialists, the 
wisdom has been that individuals give advice as individuals or, at 
most, as members of small institute groups. Group identity and inter-
action are factored in only where occasionally individuals are identified 
with a profession and the body of knowledge professionals have from 
scholarly meetings and journals. Western scholars, and their East 
European counterparts, have only glanced at "hands-on" pro-
fessionals. The assumption has been that their only work is done by 
individuals with little or no sense of how their actions fit with the 
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broader professional community and its goals. "Hands on" pro-
fessionals' only influence on policy then is assumed to be tied with 
policy-makers' anticipation of what professionals, who filter and im-
plement the policy, will do to it. In this way, the duel between policy-
makers and professionals sounds not unlike the "nondecision 
making" described in Western pluralist models. 40 
In fact, however, sociological research done on the intelligentsia in 
Eastern Europe, and particularly in Poland, has demonstrated that, 
however much Marxist theory denies the existence of groups and 
group interests, there are clear patterns of group identity and interac-
tion in all of these systems. 41 The identification of individuals with their 
professional or occupational group is stronger than their alternative 
affiliations with class, regional, or social groupings. This identification 
with one's profession or occupation is reinforced by the fact that 
individuals tend to share a common life-style, set of values, and s9cial 
circle made up primarily of those in their own profession. 42 Further-
more, professionals have a higher status and more material benefits 
than workers or party and state bureaucrats. 43 This insures their pri-
mary identification with their profession as does the fact that, as long 
as they remain in a profession, they work with and share pressures and 
problems with both Party and non-Party people in that profession. 
Groups, then, exist through informal group interaction based on 
common values and common friendships growing out of professional 
life even if formal associational channels are far more controlled than 
those of Western groups. An individual's ties with a profession are 
further strengthened by the material and status rewards he receives for 
his position. Such professional communities clearly appear in periods 
of crisis, when professional groups respond almost immediately with 
their own demands and new organizational structures. But, these 
networks and rewards also clearly continually provide for informal 
communication of individual professionals' concerns, reactions and 
gains as well as informal but effective pressure on individuals for 
group cohesion and adherence to professional norms and values. 
Western studies, both of group dynamics and of professional groups 
as interest groups, stress the importance this informal interaction has 
in insuring that a group can make an impact on policy. 44 For, as Mancur 
Olson has pointed out, even in pluralist states where there is no 
pressure against group affiliation, the activities of an organization or 
the claim of representation by a formal organization are not sufficient 
incentives for individuals to align themselves with any organization. 
Benefits attained by formal representatives are, after all, available to 
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everyone in a group regardless of his participation in the organization. 
Therefore, two other incentives must be used to bring individuals into 
organizations: direct material incentives that are available only to 
members and small group interaction and pressure. 45 In addition, 
given the strength of the informal connections between professionals 
and their socialization into a unique value system, professionalization 
theorists see formal organizations as nothing more than the product of 
the professionalization of a group and the resulting need to bridge the 
gap between public and professional "governments" so nonpro-
fessionals recognize the profession and its rights. 46 In effect, informal 
organizations of colleague networks are the vital links in professional 
life and political activity. They insure consistent policy preferences and 
reactions to policies. 
A shift, in our approach then, is required to fully understand the role 
and position of any professional group in these societies. We need to 
move away from measuring the existence of "group" input on the 
basis either of formal structures, dominated in Poland and elsewhere 
in the communist world by the political leadership, or of the public 
statements of specialists within a profession. Instead, we need to focus 
on charting informal and internal group activity and the manipulation 
of structure and policies. We also need, of course, to monitor the public 
and, where we can, the private statements and activities of individuals 
and formal organizations. 
Taking into consideration the existence of interactive groups with 
clear group goals and pressures for their cohesion, thus, adds to 
traditional Western perceptions of policy-making in communist states. 
Ironically, this assumption that some level of interaction holds individ-
uals in professional circles and insures the influence of professional 
interests on decisions has long been pivotal in Kremlinological studies 
of communist elites. 47 But, this basic assumption has not been carried 
down to the level of individuals and their respective professional 
groups. 48 As a result, policy decisions have been treated essentially as 
elite decisions for which specialist and professional advice is com-
missioned or sanctioned by the leadership. 49 Little or no consideration 
is given to competition or cooperation between groups except when 
they are pictured as "opinion clusters" composed of individuals from 
various fields with a common perspective on a specific issue. 50 Nor has 
there been sufficient consideration of the ability of groups to make their 
own policies in areas that are not of direct interest to the political 
leadership. In addition, the natural reactions of professionals, when 
policies go against their interests, needs to be taken into account. 51 
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And, given the stress by Western research on the formal invitation to 
participation and the formal, visible participation of individuals and 
group representatives in stating policy options, there has been little 
accounting, except under the rubric of "bureaucratic inertia," for the 
limits on change exerted by professionals. 52 As a result, we have been 
able to paint only a very rough sketch of the deliberate policy advocacy 
and manipulation that is done "behind the scenes." Yet, the gap 
between stated policies and their reality, the inability of even the most 
repressive regimes to transform all behavior and get full support from 
professionals, and the number of abandoned policies (as well as pol-
icies made without any elite policy commitment) make it clear that 
much goes on both without political leaders soliciting advice and 
outside formal public channels. 
Finally, as Western studies of decision-making in communist states 
have shown, it is bureaucratic interests that have the most power. 53 In 
part, Western bureaucratic theory54 can be applied to explain .. the 
strength of institutional interests in communist societies. But, bureau-
cracies' strength in protecting institutional prerogatives exists in spite 
of the penetration of the Communist Party into virtually all institutions 
- something Western theory maintains would naturally destroy insti-
tutional identity. The power of bureaucratic interests, in spite of the 
Party's penetration, exists in small, less complex institutions as well as 
in large, professionalized and insulated bureaucracies whose powers 
are critical to national policy, such as the military and the economic 
ministries. This suggests that more is involved than simply the model 
of Weberian-style bureaucracies. 
Here, too, Western professionalization theory offers a useful para-
digm. For, as the bureaucratic state developed in the West, pro-
fessionals' life increasingly moved in setting to large bureaucracies. In 
communist states, political penetration has made independent pro-
fessional work outside of some bureaucratic setting almost impossible 
even for the members of the "free professions." To deal with the 
impact of this bureaucratization on professional life, Western theorists 
have developed two paradigms: 
(1) The paradigm of patronage relations in which the consumer or 
bureaucratic employer dominates professional behavior by de-
termining how professionals should meet their needs. This is 
done through the employer's control over the recruitment of 
professionals. Because of this, professional workers' primary 
loyalty is to their employer. 
(2) The paradigm of mediative relations where a public bureauc-
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racy, involving nonprofessionals, stands between the pro-
fessional and his consumers. It decides, in part guided by the 
expertise of the professional, what the clients' needs are for 
services and how they should be met. In this case, professional 
identification is split between the employing bureaucracy and 
the professional group.ss 
If one were to follow the totalitarian model, on the other hand, 
patronage relations would determine professional behavior. Experts 
would willingly limit their activities to serving as sources of infor-
mation for elite decision-making and establishing careers solely 
through ties with members of the political elite. Their loyalty would be 
measured by their support for elite positions. It would then follow 
that, because of their ties to the political elite, professionals would 
make no attempt to articulate independent and oppositional interests. 
Their only concern would be to move up in the political hierarchy. 
Interest group research done on the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, however, shows that this is not normally the case. Pro-
fessional demands do occur. Professionals, no matter how closely they 
are connected in their work or personal lives with the political lead-
ership, do make demands and press for autonomy. And, ultimately, 
professionals are able to mediate between the public and the political 
leadership. 
The professional model 
The conflicts between theories of how groups should and can 
act unaer the constraints in communist societies and the realities of 
group action are, at least, partially explained with the professional-
ization theory that has been used by sociologists and political scientists 
to deal with groups or "professions" in the West, ranging from the 
traditional "free professions," like doctors and lawyers, to those en-
meshed in twentieth-century bureaucracies. The occupation.al groups 
to which it has been applied are defined in Western sociological theory 
as groups with unique skills and, therefore, the option of becoming 
"private governments" with at least some authority and autonomy in 
their own spheres of interest and expertise. 56 They exist as indepen-
dent communities with informal organizational structures, unique sets 
of values, and lengthy socialization processes that are longer than any 
other period of socialization in an individual's life. 57 
As a result, professionals, as portrayed by these theories, have a 
permanency of involvement and a set of values that supersede most 
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other group ties. Informal organization, characterized as it is by a 
colleague network, is the vital link in professional life. Formal pro-
fessional organizations are really structural concessions to represent a 
profession to nonprofessionals. 58 Given this model of professional life, 
explanations of professional behavior focus primarily on less articu-
lated and less public activities and on the professional and his informal 
network rather than on formal "professional" pronouncements. Pro-
fessionals are not seen as simply being "invited" into the policy pro-
cess. They also act independently to formulate professional rules and 
policies and press to protect and enhance their interests. The political 
leadership in communist societies serves, then, not as the "gate-
keeper" but as the target of professional pressure and, ultimately, the 
arbiter of professional demands. 
Professionalizing 
The ability of any profession to reach the point where it can 
build and maintain a significant amount of autonomy within a bu-
reaucracy is a result of both the process of individual professional-
ization and the process of professionalization for the group itself. The 
latter occurs as the group moves to take an increasingly autonomous 
position by establishing its own formal and informal structures. At an 
individual level, four elements are involved in transforming an indi-
vidual into a professional: (1) the recruitment and training process; (2) 
work experiences and the resulting interaction with fellow pro-
fessionals; (3) the structures and rules for controlling professionals' 
behavior that are developed within the profession and codified and 
reinforced by formal and informal professional associations; and ( 4) 
the impact of external images of the profession held by the society. 59 
Each of these four elements plays a crucial role in transmitting pro-
fessional values and expertise and in creating and maintaining an 
insulated subculture. All of them go on in any environment in which 
the profession develops. Furthermore, the experience of Polish 
journalists indicates that political pressure and manipulation of the 
profession do not stop individuals from becoming professionalized. 
These political pressures may veil the professionalization, but, in re-
ality, they sharpen and make more urgent the move to 
professionaliza tion. 
The same is true of the effect of political pressure on the pro-
fessionaliza tion of the group. In spite of the repression of the Polish 
journalism profession during World War II and under the Stalinist 
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system, as well as the pressure of the political elite against the de-
velopment of group autonomy and ideals, professionalization has 
occurred. The Polish journalism profession has followed the same 
course of development as have Western professions functioning with-
out these kinds of political controls. 
The historical pattern common to Western professions and to the 
case of Polish journalists began with individuals performing the work 
of the profession on a full-time basis and counting on it for their main 
income. When individuals were committed to the profession as full-
time work, the need to perfect a body of expertise and protect work 
options then became greater. Professionals pressed for the establish-
ment of training programs and, eventually, for their inclusion in uni-
versity curricula. This resulted in the development of standards for 
entrance into the profession that involve lengthy and costly training 
programs and early recruitment. It also has given the profession more 
exclusivity and more worth in comparison with other occupations. 
Schools, in turn, have served as an organizational base for the estab-
lishment of a professional association, with the university affiliation 
simultaneously raising the status of the profession. 60 
Those pushing for specialized training and those involved in it 
subsequently form a professional association. The title of the pro-
fession often is changed to further upgrade a profession's public 
image. The association then discusses such questions as: is this a 
profession; what are a professionals' tasks; and, how can the quality of 
recruits be raised? During these discussions, conflicts develop among 
practitioners from different backgrounds. Campaigns to separate the 
competent from the incompetent begin as well. 61 The result of these 
developments has been that the profession goes through a series of 
major upheavals. A pecking order for the delegation of tasks develops. 
The "old guard," who learned through apprenticeships and are 
committed to their patrons and the use of "talent" as jus~ification for 
entrance into the profession, fights against newcomers who came from 
the prescribed university course. This generational conflict stimulates 
pressure to put hiring and firing under professional group control. At 
the same time, there is competition for "turf" between the profession 
and neighboring groups. All of this eventually adds to the develop-
ment of an entire system, both formal and informal, to regulate pro-
fessional behavior and emphasize the role of the professional in 
serving society. It frequently involves political agitation to win the 
support of law to protect the "turf" of professional work and the 
profession's own code of ethics. To further protect their "turf" and 
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their status, professional groups also develop rules to eliminate those 
who disgrace the group, to reduce internal competition and to empha-
size that only a member of the profession can provide certain services 
to the society. 62 In the West, these crises and issues of identification are 
never fully resolved, so they return off and on as the profession 
develops and the society in which professionals work changes. 
These crises are even less fully and permanently resolved in the 
communist world. Leadership changes and increase or decrease in 
political pressure bring each one to the surface again and again. The 
demographic devastation of World War II in Poland further created an 
age imbalance that exacerbated the generational conflict and the need 
for issues to be reconsidered and battled through with each gener-
ation. And, the prohibitions on visible and independent group activity 
make any full public resolution and commitment impossible. 
Professionals and the policy process 
The nature and significance of professional group and individ-
ual professionals' involvement in the policy process is dependent on 
more, though, than the invitation and interest of the political elite in 
both Soviet bloc and Western states. The nature of an issue and its 
relevance to different individuals or groups determine who gets in-
volved and how. Which professionals and professional groups get 
involved in the policy process depends, as well, not simply on who the 
policy-makers want to hear but also on the nature of a given profession 
and the profession's own priorities. Finally, the stage at which groups 
become involved in a decision or policy and the impact they have are 
outgrowths of the nature of the policy itself as well as the political 
leadership's interest in that policy. 63 
From the perspective of professional and specialist groups, policies 
are not all the same. Some have a direct impact on a profession, its 
work and its compensation. Formal professional groups play signifi-
cant roles in organizing around these issues and advocating policies 
that increase the profession's standing and its benefits. They also act to 
strengthen professionals' power and the power of the professional 
association. In doing this, professional groups claim authority and 
responsibility for themselves. 
Other kinds of policies are relevant to professionals only when their 
expertise is relevant to resolving issues on an individual or informal 
group basis. In these cases, normally, the policy has no direct impact 
on an individual's life or work. The professional serves as a repre-
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sentative of other groups through the use of his technical expertise and 
recognized knowledge in a particular area. Finally, in some policies, 
professionals are involved as policy administrators. The passage of 
these policies affects the profession's role but not necessarily either its 
own interests or work patterns. In this final case, professional in-
volvement occurs through advocacy by the professional association or 
experts from the profession and through policy administration. 
Issues that affect professionals' own lives and work are regarded by 
professionals and their associations as their exclusive domain. The 
tendency is to keep the public and the state government away from 
what they see as professional concerns. In doing this, professional 
associations, both formal and informal, become "private govern-
ments" providing services and material benefits to their members. 
They also set up structures to regulate individual behavior within the 
professional community. Finally, they move to represent the interests 
of the profession to the public government. 64 In acting as representa-
tives of the profession, professional associations jealously guard the 
ability of professionals to be sources of information and personnel for 
governmental decisions and committees and also to serve as the links 
between the professionals and their public. 
Internally, each professional association has its own governance. 
This governance is determined by the profession's goals, the nature of 
its membership, and its members' socio-economic positions and needs 
as well as the association's past history. 65 Formal structures are in-
tended to aid the organization in being the chief law-making body for 
public regulation of professional concerns. 66 These structures also are 
designed so internal controls can be maintained on association 
members in order to increase the group's leverage on professional 
issues. 67 Professional organizations, in trying to control the profession, 
seek to diffuse conflicts among individuals coming from different 
specializations, regional bases and social backgrounds. T.o do this, 
they divide professionals up into sections reflecting the varied interests 
and foci of the group's members. 68 They also seek to develop close 
coordination between local and national branches. By establishing and 
maintaining this control and coordination, professional organizations 
influence the public regulation of the profession and its work. They 
also influence the profession's membership and its public image. 
This internal structure is not designed to insure democracy and full 
participation of all professionals within the organization. Dissent 
within the profession weakens the organization's negotiating position. 
So dissent and deviation, either in professional work patterns or be-
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havior, are discouraged both formally and informally. As a service 
organization, the professional association is involved in lobbying and 
providing guidance to the government on complex issues. Group 
democracy and action are replaced by power invested in a permanent 
bureaucracy and a relatively stable and identifiable elite. So, crucial 
issues are seldom discussed and voted on by the profession as a whole. 
Instead, they are normally handled informally by the profession's 
leaders. 
Ironically, though, however strong and visible that formal elite is, it 
is not the only professional elite. In each profession, there is, on the 
one hand, a parallel elite of individuals whose professional work is 
seen as excellent. On the other hand, those who make a career out of 
professional politics and representation are a self-selected few. They 
tend to be persons of high, but not top, prestige and authority within 
the profession. Their work is normally not a model for the profession. 
In fact, because movement up to the top of the professional organiz-
ation is usually a result of gradual advancement up through lower level 
professional offices, most of those in the formal organizational elite 
spend years of their careers working less than full-time in real pro-
fessional work. Their relationship with the profession as a whole is 
skewed by their experiences as bureaucrats and lobbyists. As a result, 
in Western democracies where professional organizations' dynamics 
have been studied, these individuals, the bureaucrats, are identified 
with the professional world they represent and not stellar professional 
work. 69 
Previous studies dealing with the dynamics of professional groups 
in Eastern Europe found patterns which seem, on the surface, similar 
to this. 70 Thus, the dynamics of professional organizations in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union may be as much a result of their pro-
fessionalism as of the demands by political leaders that they serve as 
"transmission belts." For this, the case of Polish journalists serves as a 
test since journalists are the profession whose loyalty is most 
demanded by the elite. 
Structurally, professional associations in communist societies are 
hybrids of the two most common forms of professional organization: 
the guild model of equality among lower level professionals in various 
workplace and speciality groups71 and the pyramidal hierarchy model 
of a bureaucratic structure working to protect the profession against 
external bureaucracies.72 Clearly, the pyramidal hierarchy takes on 
greater significance in communist systems where the pressure and 
interference that most bedevils the profession comes from external 
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Party and state bureaucracies' control and direction. This external 
pressure makes the nonbureaucratic guild model less effective because 
the ruling bureaucracy of the Party and state both mandates and then 
responds only to corresponding professional bureaucracies. This same 
pressure, though, also exists in increasingly bureaucratized Western 
states. 73 
The structure and effectiveness of professions' and professionals' 
involvement in policy that does not directly impact on professional 
work is limited more by political pressures than is professionals' influ-
ence on policies regulating their profession. For professional groups in 
Western and communist societies who contribute to policy-making as 
advisors or administrators, policy-making is a complex process. It has 
many stages at which individuals and groups can visibly and invisibly 
enter and impact on policies. Involvement in the early stages allows 
individuals and groups to define the issues and solutions they want to 
consider. It also allows them to determine who will be heard in the 
debate. Involvement in the middle and most public stages is often 
limited to tinkering with the basic policy set out early on.74 Finally, 
although manipulation and redrawing the administration of a policy 
often has a significant effect on the public's sense of a policy, it seldom 
leads to a change in policy and most frequently ends with sporadic and 
undeclared distortions of it. This, ultimately, may force rethinking of 
policy but is not well enough articulated to serve as a clear model for a 
policy reform. 
Journalists tend to be one of the most privileged professions because 
they enter into the early stages of policy-making and play "gate-
keepei' roles in later stages. Some have ties with top political leaders 
and know, from friends, when an issue is being discussed by the 
leadership. They can use highly personalized and private channels to 
influence top elite discussions: personal and informal connections with 
leaders and their assistants that have been built up through years of 
joint work and social contact; non-published communications to the 
elite; and part-time or full-time work in political offices. In the most 
public stage of the policy process the press is one of the major forums 
for debate and the presentation of information. At a minimum, in the 
press and professional groups, there are veiled discussions that are 
monitored by the political leaders or are reflections of private presen-
tations made directly to those leaders. It often is to the advantage of the 
politicians to allow open discussion so long as this discussion does not 
jeopardize their ideological power. Only in this way can the top elite be 
assured of obtaining the most accurate information from the broadest 
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range of experts without those experts limiting themselves to what the 
elite wants to hear. Such discussions also stimulate non-expert opinion 
from those directly affected by the policy. This is most often voiced 
through journalists' reports or letters to journals and public agencies. 75 
Once data has been presented, the elite tends to withdraw to pre-
pare a draft or final proposal for approval by the designated govern-
ment agency. This normally ends the debate on a specific policy but 
does not always end the policy process. Individuals, even in strictly 
regulated communist polities, articulate their interests indirectly and 
try to get special treatment. Frequently, the aggregate behavior of 
social groups in response to a policy becomes a significant part of the 
memory of the elite and of society. This is then taken into account 
when policy-makers redesign policy. Journalists contribute to both the 
articulation of individual interests and the visibility of specific group 
responses to policies by acting as ombudsmen for individual probJems 
and constantly reporting on events and attitudes through their public 
and private channels. This means that, while citizens are made aware 
of policies through the media, journalists also serve as channels to 
modify the impact of policies on individual citizens and to alert policy-
makers to problems in how their policies work. Finally, explicit and 
direct criticism of the impact and administration of a law is made. This 
broader discussion, characterized in its public form as "press criti-
cism," is, in part, an indication of policy-makers' interest in the admin-
istration and the success or failure of a policy in real life. From the 
perspective of the population, this press criticism is aimed at pressur-
ing the elite to legitimize discussion and modify a policy. 
Clearly, journalists are more involved in policy discussions than 
many professions because of their control over media platforms for 
public dabate and their ties with political elites. Like the professional 
organizations that protect professional interests, this involvement is 
not simply a matter of invitation by the policy-makers. It is a product of 
the relationship between professional role demands and the require-
ments of political involvement. Frequently, too, elite policy-making is 
influenced by the experiences they had, when they worked in one or 
another profession or policy area. 76 
As in the West, movement from professional work to political work 
is dependent on the nature of the profession: the congruence of the 
skills of professionals and those needed by politicians; the ability of 
individuals in a given profession to abandon their work for temporary 
or permanent political activity; and the particular occupational needs 
satisfied by the government. 77 For journalists and lawyers in both the 
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East and West, movement into politics does not go against professional 
requirements and traditions. For other professions, like the medical 
profession, movement into politics requires time and skills which 
practicing in a profession like medicine does not allow. As a result, 
some professions are more likely to be actively involved in policy 
debates not directly affecting their professional worlds than are others. 
Thus, Western oriented professionalization theory provides a model 
for explaining both the power of professionals and specialists and the 
ability of groups to affect policy in communist systems when neither 
professional dominance nor group interests are recognized as legiti-
mate. Clearly, the gate-keeper role of the political elite is crucial in any 
situation. But, the apparent congruence of behavior between Western 
professional associations and those in Eastern Europe suggests that 
the natural dynamics of professional interaction may be a significant 
factor in politics. It also suggests that this will be more true for purely 
professional issues with low political salience and a limited constitu-
ency than it is with other issues. But, in less visible ways, professional 
input, buoyed by professionalization, occurs on all levels. 
Polish journalists: the virtues of atypicality 
The a typicality of Polish journalists and their national environ-
ment makes their professionalism an ideal and accessible model for 
looking at the relationship between professionalization, professional 
group imperatives, and professionals' input in policy-making. Polish 
jour!_1alists, first of all, do not have the normal qualities that are 
assumed by Western theorists to be necessary for a group to feel that it 
is imperative to act as professionals. To a greater extent than most 
professions, journ~list~_ciQ __ I}ot_share acommon ~~~1ss ori_gin. They are 
very involved in politics and very divided as a group in their political 
orientations. They enter the profession without any single training 
base. 
They have, however, all the characteristics of professional groups: , 
high levels of self-definition as professionals, and of loyalty to their ( 
profession. In addition, they have had very high, almost exclusionary,: 
patterns of informal group interaction. Like Western journalists, they' 
have developed this sense of an overriding professional identity in 
spite of the fact that they are in a highly unregulated, competitive, yet 
bureaucratized field, and do their work through constant formal and 
social contacts with individual sources of information from outside the 
profession. They must maintain and impose their professional identity 
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and boundaries on a world where writing well is not considered either 
a unique skill or a technological necessity. 
Finally, the world of Polish politics is the most tumultuous and 
unstable in Eastern Europe. It is a political situation into which journal-
ists are constantly drawn. The demands on them, though, are never 
consistent. This makes them periodically rethink their personal and 
professional ideals and affiliations. 
Research opportunities 
For Western researchers, Poland is also an environment where 
discussion and action are more open and visible than in other more 
stable and controlled communist states. So, even under the conditions 
of the mid-seventies, interviews, survey research, and access to in-
ternal professional transcripts and reports allowed this study to sutvey 
far more than merely what had been published. This primary data, 
reinforced and enlivened by the words and works of journalists, press 
scholars, and politicians in the heady discussions and experiments of 
the Solidarity era and the dramatic changes that came with martial law, 
provided the data for much of this discussion of journalists' life and 
work. It reflects the research done on the journalism profession in the 
West and the research of Polish scholars on the profession as well as 
the writings of journalists about their work, their profession, and their 
concerns. In fact, much of the discussion of changes is based on Polish 
scholars' surveys done in 1958 and 196278 among Polish journalists and 
a survey done by this author in 1976 using a similar sample of Polish 
journalists. More impressionistic evidence as well as information 
about policy relevant behavior and non-public negotiations largely 
comes from interviews with 200 journalists in Poland in 197S-76 and 
smaller samples in 1979 and 1983. This data was further validated by 
the comparable interview results when interviews were done with 
former Polish journalists in Western Europe and the United States 
between 1976 and 1983.79 
Professional demographics 
Polish journalists, as a group, have been one of the most 
diverse professions in postwar Poland. 80 Their social composition, 
particularly it1 terms of class origins and the level of feminization, have 
changed dramatically since the communist takeover after World War 
II. Beginning in 1948, workers, peasants, and women entered the 
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profession in large numbers - far larger than before the war. 81 In the 
initial postwar years of Stalinism, the profession grew rapidly (Table 
1). This Stalinist era group continued to be the core of the profession for 
the next thirty years since they came into the profession, in the late 
forties and early fifties, when they were in their teens and early twen-
ties. As a result of this stability, there were places for only a few recruits 
in the sixties and seventies. And, while a large number of the pro-
fession's elite, who had entered soon after the war, retired, resigned, 
or were kept out of the profession after the declaration of martial law, 
this generation remained a major professional force both numerically 
and as role models for professional work in the post-1981 era. The next 
most numerically and professionally significant group has come from 
the 1970s entrants who rose to prominence as a result of Solidarity and 
the changes in the profession. 
As a profession, journalists and journalism are considered to be part 
of the intelligentsia. They have life-styles, values, and social status like 
those of other intelligentsia groups. But, at least in the forties and 
fifties, when there was massive recruitment of potentially loyal regime 
followers into the profession, the majority of those able to get work in 
the profession were working class. From 1950 to 1955, 66 percent of the 
students in journalism education programs were working class. 82 
These "intelligentsia converts" remained in journalism for the next 
thirty years. For them, the gains in being raised from the working class 
to the intelligentsia have been invaluable. 
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In later years, the smaller groups of entrants into the profession were 
less working class in origin. By 1964, only 34.2 percent of the pro-
fession as a whole claimed to be from working-class backgrounds. 83 
This balance did not change dramatically in the 1970s. In fact, in 
television, the number of journalists coming from working-class back-
grounds was so low that one journalist commented that being working 
class was "an element of snobbism among television journalists."84 
This was, in part, a reflection of television journalism's higher visibility 
and material benefits. But, basically, it was a result of the fact that 
television emerged as a "serious" media in Poland only in the 1970s. 
Then, when most television journalists were hired, the issue of "class 
background" was less significant. 
With the advent of the Solidarity period, the class structure of the 
profession did not change dramatically. Worker journalists were not 
treated as members of the profession. Those already in the .. pro-
fessional association and in established professional circles simply 
treated "worker-journalists" as newcomers who would have to serve 
the customary apprenticeship period before they could be treated as 
full-scale professionals. 
Education and professional training, as is clear from the problems 
and adjustments in the journalism education programs of the postwar 
period, are not required for professional work in journalism. In the 
early period of heavy recruitment, there were more journalists with 
only high school education than there were with university degrees. 85 
Even by 1969, only 58 percent of working journalists had completed a 
university education and an even smaller percentage had formal jour-
nalism training. The legacy of the fifties remained: politics took prece-
dence so 72 percent of journalists under thirty-five had completed their 
university degrees but only 34 percent of those between forty-five and 
fifty-five, individuals who entered the profession in the initial postwar 
years when political qualifications were paramount, had finished their 
university course work. 86 Furthermore, few journalists in Warsaw 
actually finished professional training and even fewer of those who 
worked outside Warsaw had training in journalism.87 This pattern 
continued throughout the Solidarity period. 
Not only has professionalization occurred without autonomous pro-
fessional education, but, it also occurred even where individuals en-
tered journalism from other fields. To make this shift involved getting 
new skills and working in new ways as well as shedding old loyalties. 
More than half of the journalists surveyed in 1962 had worked outside 
journalism: 49.7 percent had had no other work prior to entering 
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journalism, 16.5 percent had been government bureaucrats, 8.3 per-
cent had worked in other areas of publishing, 1.6 percent had been in 
the arts, 1.6 percent had been workers, 1.5 percent censors, 1.3 percent 
engineers, 1.2 percent military or internal security officers, and 0.6 
percent lawyers. 88 A similar question in 1976 showed a comparable 
relationship between individuals with journalism as a first and only 
profession and those with training and work experience in some other 
profession. In fact, because this later survey was done primarily 
among regional and lower level journalists, even more (60 percent) 
claimed to have had some other profession prior to becoming journal-
ists. This movement into journalism from other work is reported to 
have gone on in the 1980 period as well, among those who did make a 
permanent move into the profession. 
Professionals' political affiliations 
The prime challenges to the autonomy of journalism come 
from the political authorities in Poland. They define the journalism 
profession as an "instrument of the Party" and demand that it be a part 
of the political establishment in a more direct sense than other pro-
fessions are. Party membership is, therefore, more common for 
journalists than for other professional groups in Poland. Nearly half 
(47 percent) of all members of the Association of Polish Journalists 
(SOP) and 56 percent of all those involved in work related to journalism 
were Party members as of 1975. 89 
Ironically, though, whether or not having that percentage of journal-
ists as party members was considered ideal, it is clear that the regime 
has been able to encourage but not force Party membership. The 
martial law attempt to get control of the profession and limit its auton-
omy did not result in journalists taking on Party membership as a 
prerequisite to professional work. The profession was, at least initially, 
fragmented because of individuals' intense reaction to martial law and 
its system of repression. Many journalists left established, high visi-
bility positions and Party membership on their own or because they 
were blacklisted. Membership in the new Association of Polish 
Journalists of the Polish People's Republic (SDPRL) also ceased to be a 
simple matter of membership and became a political statement because 
the new Association appeared as an imposed substitute for the old 
Association, involved as it was in 1980-81 with Solidarity. 90 So, since 
membership was taken as a sign of support for the regime, a slightly 
higher percentage of the Association registered Party membership. As 
of 3 May, 1983, of the 5,375 members of the SDPRL, 65 percent were 
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members of the Communist Party and 4 percent were members of the 
two minor parties. 91 The rest had no party affiliations. Still, even under 
martial law, the authorities could not bring nearly half of the working 
professionals into Party membership. 
_A_s with other professions involved in politics, appointment to im-
portant positions in the profession is controlled by the Party through 
its right to approve all major appointments (nomenklatura) at all govern-
mental levels. Therefore, in managerial positions considered import-
ant by the Party bureaucracy or leadership, Party membership is 
higher than in other positions. In 1977, according to a report by the 
Association of Polish Journalists: 
Membership in political organizations by editors down to the level of 
managing editor is high. In RSW Prasa [the major publishing house 
formally sponsored by the Polish United Workers Party], 80% are 
members of political organizations [including the minor parti~]. In 
Radio and Television, 70% are members. 92 
For purely journalistic positions (beginning with managing editor but 
not including editorial writers), the percentage of Party members is 
significantly lower. 93 For those who entered in the Stalinist period of 
early and massive recruitment, though, Party membership was clearly 
an advantageous substitute for the previous experience and education 
new entrants did not have. More of those who entered in this period 
are Party members than was the case for those who joined in the 1960s 
and 1970s. 94 Yet, this Party membership did not necessarily guarantee 
journalists easy advancement into prestigious positions other than the 
few closely controlled by the Party's nomenklatura. 
This has been clear not only from the presence of a significant 
percentage of non-Party members in the upper levels of the pro-
fessional hierarchy but also by the concentration of journalists who are 
Party members. Warsaw, the most advantageous and prestigious 
place to live and work, has a much smaller percentage of Party journal-
ists than other areas where professional work has lower status but 
staffs are smaller and local officials' surveillance is far higher. 95 While 
there was a temporary dip in Party membership as a result of Soli-
darity's power, particularly in smaller cities and towns outside the 
capital, the prevalence of Party membership in the regions outside of 
Warsaw returned with the reimposition of media control under martial 
law. In 1983, then, 70.3 percent of regional journalists were Party 
members - a clear increase from the late seventies. 96 
Party membership, in the past, has had somewhat greater influence 
on the field of specialization: 
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The highest level of Party membership is found in the Party depart-
ment (organization department). In that department, 89.1 % are 
P.U.W.P. members. A significant number of Party members are also 
in the departments of economics (54% ), agriculture (51 % ), infor-
mation (from news agencies) (52% ), international (48.5%) and 
national (48%). 97 
The high percentage of Party members in the information department 
(the lowest paid, lowest in status, and most isolated) then is evidence 
that Party membership has been an aid to entrance but _not necessarily 
any guarantee of mobility within the profession. 
Self-identification 
Whatever their backgrounds, political affiliations, and past 
ties, journalists see themselves as journalists. They also see their 
profession as "the best" of the professions. In fact, measured by the 
standards of willingness to leave the profession, ranking of occu-
pations, and journalists' rates of interaction with members of other 
groups as compared to their interaction with fellow journalists, Polish 
journalists have a higher level of professional identification than has 
existed in any other professional grouping. 98 Overwhelmingly, in 
1976, journalists surveyed said they would not like to leave the pro-
fession (86.6 percent of those surveyed said they would not like to 
leave the profession, 12.6 percent said they would like to leave it). Even 
in the aftermath of criticism of the media in the Solidarity period and 
the repression of journalists and media workers involved with the 
reform movement, ultimately few complete departures from the pro-
fession took place. One estimate by a former official of the SOP was that 
initially some 2,000 left because of expulsions or an unwillingness to 
work under the military regime; but, within six months of the declara-
tion of martial law, all but a few had returned to the profession in some 
form - lesser known publications, writing under pseudonyms, under-
ground writing, or publishing jobs - and all but a few who remained 
outside the profession did so as journalists making symbolic gestures. 
Even at that, professional circles and information exchanges continued 
and were strengthened in this period (for a full discussion of the 
professional response and involvement in Solidarity and during the 
martial law period, see chapter 6). 
Journalists' responses in 1976 to the question "What do you think is 
the best occupation?" were equally indicative of individuals' commit-
ment to journalism and its basic goals. The largest percentage of 
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respondents listed "journalism" as the best occupation (23.6 percent). 
Those who did not see their own profession as the "best" tended to 
focus on other comparable professions. In the case of Warsaw pro-
fessionals, most saw the non-technical intelligentsia as "the best" but, 
in the case of regional journalists, technical intelligentsia careers were 
considered the best. On the other hand, although 9.2 percent of the 
journalists surveyed held Party positions and 49.4 percent said they 
performed some official social function, none listed "Party activist" as 
the "best occupation." Only two respondents listed institutional party 
and state positions as the "best occupation." Similar results were 
reported in 1958 when journalists had to rank professional groups. 
Then, journalists ranked teachers, doctors and engineers highest be-
cause of their roles in "educating the society" and "developing 
Poland" - roles journalists' own professional ideology specifies as 
primary responsibilities of their profession. Lawyers and artists ..,were 
ranked lowest because they had "little influence on changes in the 
society" and "play a minimal role in the society" - again a reflection of 
journalists' application of their professional values. 99 
The 1976 breakdown of these measures of identification in terms of 
the other potential pulls on journalists' self-identification indicates that 
professional identification is overwhelming. In fact, competing pulls 
for loyalty tend to increase identification with journalism. Members of 
the PUWP are more positive about the profession than are non-Party 
journalists: 38.5 percent of PUWP journalists think journalism is the 
best occupation while 22. 7 percent of non-Party journalists ranked it as 
the "best profession." Working-class background, correlated as it is 
with Party affiliation and with the profession as the prime mode of 
upward mobility, yields virtually the same breakdown. 
Anecdotal evidence further indicates that, in spite of journalists' 
own criticisms of their profession's past work and in spite of public 
attacks in the 1980s on the media, this positive image of the profession 
has remained. Problems were blamed on outside interference and 
occasional "weak" professionals not on the professional work itself. 100 
Individuals left the profession after martial law because their past work 
was defamed or not appreciated and they "had fought the battle to be 
professionals too long." They did not leave because they had found 
some better calling. Finally, whether or not they remained in their 
positions, journalists continued to do work related to information 
gathering and presentation and attacked those who denigrated the 
profession by violating professional ethics or restricting their pro-
fessional autonomy to suit political demands. 
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Informal group interaction 
Even more crucial than individual identification in determin-
ing a profession's ability to function as a group controlling its own 
world and acting in the public arena are the patterns of individual 
social interaction. In communist societies where formal professional 
organizations are monitored and controlled, independent action oc-
curs primarily through individuals' informal, personal relationships. 
The more the profession is the prime source for professionals' friend-
ships, the greater its base for group action. To identify patterns of 
informal group life, three questions were asked of Polish journalists: 
"With whom do you associate most frequently?"; "How would you 
characterize staff relations on your journal?"; and "Do you interact 
with journalists from other journal staffs?" 
Journalists in both 1956 and 1976 reported that they spent most of 
their social time either with other journalists or with their own immedi-
ate families. 101 Professional factors (residence, position and years in the 
profession) and incidental personal factors (such as wartime affili-
ations) account for variations in journalists' social lives. Those outside 
of Warsaw spend more time with other journalists than do those living 
in Warsaw who, on the whole, have much larger intelligentsia cir-
cles.102 Journalists in editorial positions spent slightly less of their 
nonwork time with other journalists than did those who were simply 
staff journalists. Party members associate as frequently with other 
journalists as do those with no Party affiliation, although they do have 
a slight tendency to see Party activists more frequently (9.1 percent of 
Part}[ members said they associated frequently with Party activists 
while 2.6 percent of non-Party members reported contacts with Party 
activists in their personal lives). 103 
Entry into the profession without the customary educational creden-
tials and class background is also not a deterrent to close primary social 
contacts with other journalists. In fact, in both 1958 and 1976, journal-
ists' involvement with other journalists was greater for those coming 
from working-class backgrounds or having less than a full university 
level education. For them, not only was entry into the profession a 
significant move for upward mobility but it also was the most comfort-
able of the intelligentsia professions with which they could associate. 104 
Interaction with journalists from staffs other than their own, a dem-
onstration of professional group as opposed to work place affiliations, 
is high. Not only are relations between journalists on a single staff close 
but journalists relate socially and professionally with members of other 
staffs with high frequency. Given both the high level of primary social 
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interaction among journalists and the extent of journalists' association 
with members of other staffs (88.5 percent of those surveyed in 1976 
said that they associated with journalists outside their immediate work 
group), there clearly are informal links that draw professionals 
together outside of their workplace, allowing them to discuss their 
problems and options as well as to reinforce common goals and behav-
ior patterns. From this data too, there are indications that, even in 
"normal periods" of external control, there has been an interlocking 
pattern of contacts holding journalists together as more than col-
leagues who work together and need to protect their journal or tele-
vision program. 
With the advent of the Solidarity press and the movement of work-
ers and non-journalists into it, these patterns of association by tra-
ditional journalists did not decrease. Even those who worked for 
Solidarity and its press reported in 1983 that, when martial law had 
closed their journals and offices down, they had little inclination to 
continue their ties with the workers and new "journalists" with whom 
they worked during the fifteen months of Solidarity. Instead, they kept 
their ties with colleagues from earlier years. The only deviation from 
the pattern that appeared in the 1958 and 1976 surveys was that, after 
martial law was declared, journalists had a tendency to exclude from 
their social circles old friends and colleagues who had made different 
political choices in responding to the declaration of martial law and the 
closing down of the old postwar association. This split was particularly 
evident among older journalists who had entered the profession after 
the war and had their own independent financial cushion. It was less 
the case for young journalists who were dependent on their work for 
their livelihood. 
The Polish case 
The world in which these journalists work has been one of 
change and upheaval interspersed with longer periods of stability and 
Party control. It is also _  Qn_e,jn_ which even the most control-oriented 
leadership hasbeen-iorced to compromise full communist rule and 
i:e-cogriize the Catholic Church's righ(to function and the right of the 
peasantry to private farming, as well as to show greater tolerance of 
independent opinion than has existed elsewhere in the Sovief bloc: · All 
of this brought with it a factionalization of the political leadership that 
gave journalists options in their elite affiliations. With this factional-
ization among regime politicians and compromise with popular 
demands on the mass level, Poland has, since the Stalinist period, been 
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a "quasi-pluralistic authoritarian" state rather than a representative of 
the more authoritarian Soviet model. 105 Leaders have been overthrown 
by mass action three times, as the Gierek leadership was in August 
1980. The media and leadership policies have been subject to scathing 
criticisms in each of these periods of upheaval. Journalists and other 
groups, thus, have been pushed and pulled from one set of demands 
and expectations to another. They also have regularly experienced 
losses of freedom after the Party leadership quashed popular unrest. 
With this has come disillusionment and retreat into silent work for 
individual and group interests. 
The instability of political rule in Poland has brought vyith it a greater 
freedom for groups to be seen and their demands heard. It has meant, 
even in the Stalinist period, a decreased · level of fear and increased 
willingness publicly to voice demands and opinions about the political 
situation. 
In these ways, the experience of Polish journalists is an atypical case 
for Soviet bloc states. But, although the boundaries of tolerance have 
normally been broader in Poland than in other Soviet bloc states, the 
state ideology, the Party and state institutions, and the "rules of the 
game" are the same as those in the other systems in Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union. 106 And, while the shifts in leadership and the 
periods of free discussion have given journalists a sense of freedom 
and an acute sense of being controlled when liberalization moves are 
halted, the directicm and pressure of Poland's political leadership has 
been toward using the media and controlling or coopting the 
profession. 
Journaljsts' ability _  t.Q _  11!~~!1tain and protect themselves is based not 
simply on greater freedom J~ _  Poland but on their professionalization. 
This took root not in the uniquely Polish moments of freedom but in 
the"i-epressive days of the Stalinist imposition of communist rule. Such-
soil clearly also rooted the journalists of Hungary, who joined the 
"revolution" in 1956, and Czechoslovakia, many of whom were lead-
ers or observers in 1968. 107 These journalists behaved as Polish journal-
ists did in 1956, 1970, and 1980. And, the realities of professional life, 
although the restrictions may be looser, are not that distinct from the 
realities of journalists' lives in the more controlled system of the rest of 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 108 The similarities in the system 
and in journalists' reactions to them suggest that the Polish profession 
is a more accessible but not necessarily the only professional group, or 
a more real element, in communist politics than its counterparts in 
other systems or from other professions. 
